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Abstract: This paper examines the various economic interactions between Canada and 
Korea; merchandise trades, transactions in services, foreign direct investment, mobility of 
human factors, and immigration.  While trades remain to be a small share in each 
country’s total international trades, the prospect of some positive structural change such as 
an increasing alignment of export industries of Canada and Korea is noticed in the context 
of the two countries’ intimate economic integration with the U.S. economies.  More 
impressive economic interactions are found in the areas, which involve people-to-people 
interactions, such as the demand for and supply of the Canadian educational services. The 
unique profiles of Korean migration, and the sustained wealth effect of the strongly 
rebounding Korean economy may combine to fuel a continued upward trend of Korean 
immigration to Canada.  
_______________________________ 
I wish to gratefully acknowledge the research assistance by Mr. Leo Lui, and helpful comments from my 
colleague Professor Peter Ibbott. Peter and I are working on some quantitative analysis of the Korean-
Canadian migration.  Remaining errors are mine.
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1. Introduction 
 The economic interactions between the two countries can be broken down into 
three categories: flows of goods and services, flows of physical or financial capital, and 
flows of human capital, actual and potential.  The third category includes the migration of 
workers or permanent immigration for economic reasons.1 Its scope can be broadened to 
include some very closely related issues, such as, the migration of apparently limited 
duration; for instance, travels or flows of tourists, and overseas studies or flows of students 
across the borderline. This broadened concept of economic interactions can be termed 
‘people-to-people’ economic interactions. 
 Looking over the past couple decades of economic interactions between Canada 
and Korea, one is duly impressed with their progress and development. The growth is 
partly due to globalization trend that has been gripping the world and the two countries in 
it, and partly due to a couple of auspicious changes which result from conscious efforts at 
the level of the two countries’ policy makers. All in all, one can safely say that the overall 
growth of the economic interactions between the two countries in particular exceeds the 
general trends of the growth of each country’s economic interactions with the world.   
Each country has become a major partner to each other in many faceted economic 
interactions. 
 This rising importance is all the more prominent in so-called ‘people-to-people’ 
interactions between the two countries than in the conventional bilateral trade or foreign 
investment. Trades have grown fast between Canada and Korea, pushing both countries as 
an important partner in each other’s international trades. However, they remain to be a 
rather small portion of the entire trade volumes of each country.  The same story applies to 
the flows of capital across the border of the two countries. Of course, we will go to a 
considerable length and to show that there are some meaningful and positive 
developments to some aspects in these areas of conventional economic interactions that 
deserve our academic attention.  
 The people-to-people economic interactions, including immigration, tourism, and 
overseas studies, not only represent an important economic interaction for the present time, 
but seems to herald an even more significant economic integration of the two countries for 
                                                 
1 We can say that there is virtually no immigration for political reasons between Canada and Korea 
as there is no refugee from South Korea. There are immigrants for socio-economic reasons who 
might fall in the category of ‘Family Reunion’.  Our current focus is not on this group of 
immigrants in this particular paper.  Canada has no choice over this kind of immigration, except 
for the control of speed of processing the applications, and thus there is no interaction of supply 
and demand.  
 
 3
the future. A historical review of Canada’s major ethnic immigrants reveals the impact of 
these flows over the ensuing periods.   
 
2. Trades 
1) Overview 
 There are a few things to take note of in the bilateral trade between Canada 
and Korea.  First, from the viewpoint of Canada, Korea’s exports and imports have 
increased steadfastly for the last couple of decades. Now Korea is one of the top 10 trading 
countries for Canada; as of 2002, Korea ranks eighth in terms of exports and imports. 
Canada’s imports from Korea amounted to 4.9 billion Canadian dollars and its exports to 
Canadian $ 2.0 billion. Given the relatively short history of their relationship, the Canada-
Korean bilateral trade volume of C$6.9 billion fares well with the counterparts for 
Canada’s bilateral trade with some countries that have long-standing ties, such as the 
‘mother country’ United Kingdom(C$14.1 billion), Japan(C$23.7 billion), and, to some 
extent, China (C $ 20.4 billion).2 
 Particularly, the Korean exports to Canada have registered a substantial 
increase in the recent year, from C$ 3.3 billion in 1998 to C$ 4.9 billion in 2002.  This 
apparently impressive increase in Korean exports to Canada is single-handedly owing to 
the performance of the Korean automobile exports; Passenger motor vehicle exports from 
Korea has increased from C$260 million in 1998 to C$1,300 million in 2002.  
 The composition of traded items between the two countries shows a 
relatively high degree of concentration among a few selected items. The major items of 
Canadian imports from Korea are automobiles and parts, electrical or electronic 
machinery(semiconductors, appliances), and nuclear-related machinery. These three items 
account for nearly 70% of the total Canadian imports from Korea. The Canadian exports 
are slightly more diversified, but wood and pulps, minerals and oils combine to account 
for 55% of the total Canadian exports to Korea. Around 80% of the exports and imports 
are clustered around 10 items respectively.        
  
 
                                                 
2 It might appear that China has made a great advance in the recent years as a ‘new kid on the 
block’. However, a substantial part of the trading volume of C $20.4 billions should be attributed 
to a geographic divergence from the former Hong Kong. In other words, it would be fair to say that 
a large part of the increase in bilateral trades after the 1997 return of Hong Kong to Chinese 
sovereignty has been made by the businessmen who used to hold the Hong Kong citizenship but 
now hold the Chinese or Canadian citizenship. Due to this complicated structural and political 
change, the true magnitude of economic contributions by the Hong Kong immigrants in Canada is 
hard to measure.  
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Canada’s Trade with Top 10 Trading Countries 
(Unit: billion Canadian dollars) 
Table 1. Canada’s Exports 
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
U.S.A. 269.9 308.1 359.3 351.8 345.4 
Japan 8.6 8.6 9.3 8.3 8.3 
United Kingdom 
(U.K.) 
4.4 4.8 5.7 5.1 4.4 
China 2.5 2.7 3.7 4.2 4.1 
Germany 2.7 2.4 3.2 2.9 3.0 
Mexico 1.5 1.6 2.0 2.8 2.4 
France  1.7 1.9 1.9 2.2 2.0 
Korea, South 1.8 2.0 2.3 2.0 2.0 
Belgium 1.5 1.9 2.1 1.9 1.9 
Netherlands 1.9 1.6 1.4 1.6 1.8 
SUB-TOTAL 296.5 335.5 391.0 382.7 375.4 
OTHERS 21.9 19.9 22.2 21.3 20.9 
TOTAL (ALL 
COUNTRIES) 
318.4 355.4 413.2 404.0 396.3 
Source of data: Statistics Canada 
Table 2. Canada’s Imports 
 
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
U.S.A. 203.6 215.6 229.6 218.3 218.3 
China 7.7 9.0 11.3 12.7 16.0 
Japan 14.0 15.0 16.6 14.6 15.4 
Mexico 7.7 9.5 12.1 12.1 12.7 
United Kingdom 
(U.K.) 
6.3 8.1 13.0 11.7 9.7 
Germany 6.1 6.9 7.8 8.0 8.3 
France  4.9 5.3 4.2 5.5 5.8 
Re-Imports (Canada) 4.9 5.5 6.8 7.1 5.4 
Korea, South 3.3 3.6 5.2 4.6 4.9 
Italy  3.4 3.6 3.7 4.0 4.4 
SUB-TOTAL 261.8 282.2 310.2 298.7 301.0 
OTHERS 36.6 38.2 46.7 44.4 476.7 
TOTAL (ALL 
COUNTRIES) 
298.4 320.4 356.9 343.1 348.7 
Source of data: Statistics Canada 
A large part of this long-term growth in trading volumes between the two countries 
is due to the common trends of globalization that have gripped Canada as well as Korea. 
Throughout the 1990s and early 2000, both the overall Canadian exports and imports have 
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expanded faster than GDP. In Canada, merchandise exports amounted to close to 40% of 
GDP in 2001, up from 25% in the 1980s.    
Canada’s largest trading partner by far has been the U.S., and the relative 
importance has been growing rapidly in recent years particularly due to the 1994 North 
American Free Trade Agreement. For instance, the shares of Canada-U.S. bilateral trade in 
Canada’s total trades with the world rose from 68% in 1990 to 76% in 2002. Currently 
nearly 90% of the total Canadian exports go to the U.S.3  
The Korean share in Canada’s bilateral trade grew fairly fast from 0.1% in the 
1970s and reached 1% in the mid 1980s. The share has ever since hovered around 1%, 
showing a small decline in the recent years. Looking closely, we can see that the share of 
Canada’s exports to Korea in the total Canadian exports has slipped from a 1% level to a 
0.5% level since the late 1990s while the share of the Canadian imports from Korea has 
registered little changes in percentage terms.   
Therefore, the afore-mentioned increase in Korea’s exports to Canada in the recent 
years is mainly due to a strong Canadian import growth from the world in general.  At the 
micro-level, there is no denying that th exports from Korean automobile industry to 
Canada have registered an outstanding growth.  
We note that Canada-U.S. trade is mostly intra-industry and intra-firm trade in 
industrial goods; a large part comprises automotive products. To the extent that the Korean 
imports to Canada are aligned with the Canada-US trades, Korea is a beneficiary of the 
NAFTA and the increasing economic integration between U.S. and Canada.  The single 
most important structural change in the Korean trade with Canada in recent years is an 
increasing alignment of selective Korean and Canadian export industries.  In concrete, the 
observed increase in the outsourcing of the Canadian exports industries to Korean partners 
provides a kind of ‘free ride’ the U.S. market for Korean exporters. A similar story can be 
told of the Canada’s benefits from the Korea’s relatively high degree of economic 
integration with China; for instance, the Canadian automobile part industry is greatly 
                                                 
3 Of Canada's remaining trading partners, only the United Kingdom, Japan and China account for 
export shares above 1%. Although two-way merchandise trade between Canada and Mexico has 
grown rapidly since the NAFTA, its share in Canada's total trade remains small. Imports sources 
are more diversified, with the European Union and East Asia each accounting for some 11-14% of 
Canada's total imports.  
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interested in exports to China through joint ventures in Korea. This is evident in the 
rising interests of Canadian foreign direct investment to Korea in the automobile part 
industry. 4 
We can easily deduct that due to the NAFTA a circuitous trade between Canada 
and Korea has been increasing. This also explains the widening gap in the Korean and 
Canadian statistics of exports and imports.  This Korean experience contrasts sharply with 
the case of Japan, whose share in the total Canadian trade has been waned considerably 
with the NAFTA agreement. 
 
which has significantly suffered from the NAFTA and the deepening U.S.-
Canadian economic integration.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 The total accumulative sum of investment by Canada in Korea amounts to about US $ 3 billion 
for the period of 1962 –2002. A half of the total amount was report in year 2001. This investment 
consists of portfolio investment and FDI. The majority of the new Canadian FDI investment takes 
place in the industry of automobile part. The source of the data is the Ministry of Commerce, 
Industry and Energy, Korean Government. 
 
Table 3. Shares of Canada's Trade with Selected 
Countries in Canada's Total Trade     
             
Year with/to/from U.S.  with/to/from Japan with/to/from  China With/to/from Korea 
  Bilateral Exports  Imports   bilateral   Exports  Imports  Bilateral   Exports Imports Bilateral Exports Imports 
1968 70.5 67.9 73.3 3.7 4.5 2.9 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1
1969 69.5 68.6 70.5 3.7 4.1 3.4 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1
1970 65.1 62.3 68.6 4.4 4.6 4.0 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.1
1975 64.5 63.0 66.0 4.8 6.2 3.4 0.3 0.1 0.5 0.4 0.2 0.5
1980 63.9 60.6 67.5 4.8 5.5 3.9 0.7 1.1 0.2 0.6 0.5 0.6
1985 72.2 75.2 68.7 5.1 4.7 5.7 0.7 1.0 0.4 1.0 0.6 1.5
6 71.0 74.9 66.8 5.6 4.7 6.6 0.7 0.9 0.5 1.1 0.8 1.5
7 69.5 72.8 65.9 5.9 5.4 6.3 0.9 1.1 0.6 1.2 0.9 1.5
8 67.3 70.4 64.0 6.4 6.1 6.8 1.3 1.8 0.7 1.3 0.8 1.7
9 67.1 70.7 63.4 6.5 6.2 6.9 0.8 0.8 0.9 1.4 1.1 1.8
1990 67.7 72.7 62.3 6.1 5.4 6.8 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.3 0.9 1.6
1 69.2 75.8 62.3 6.1 4.9 7.4 1.1 1.2 1.0 1.4 1.3 1.4
2 70.9 77.8 63.5 5.8 4.6 7.1 1.5 1.4 1.6 1.1 0.9 1.3
3 73.4 81.3 65.0 5.3 4.6 6.1 1.3 0.9 1.8 1.1 0.9 1.3
4 74.4 82.5 65.8 4.8 4.3 5.4 1.4 1.0 1.9 1.1 1.0 1.2
1995 74.1 80.4 66.7 4.9 4.5 5.4 1.6 1.2 2.1 1.2 1.0 1.4
6 75.5 82.3 67.4 4.1 3.7 4.5 1.5 1.0 2.1 1.1 1.0 1.2
7 75.7 83.2 67.5 4.0 3.4 4.6 1.5 0.7 2.3 1.0 1.0 1.0
8 76.8 84.8 68.2 3.7 2.7 4.7 1.6 0.8 2.6 0.8 0.6 1.1
9 77.5 86.7 67.3 3.5 2.4 4.7 1.7 0.7 2.8 0.8 0.6 1.1
2000 76.5 87.0 64.4 3.4 2.2 4.7 1.9 0.9 3.2 1.0 0.6 1.4
 76.3 87.1 63.6 3.1 2.1 4.3 2.3 1.0 3.7 0.9 0.5 1.3
 75.7 87.2 62.6 3.2 2.1 4.4 2.7 1.0 4.6 0.9 0.5 1.4
 
Source: constructed from the IMF and Statistics Canada data. 
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The growing gap between the Canadian and Korean statistics is illustrated in the 
following figures, which are based on Canadian and Korean statistics respectively. They 
convey differing stories of bilateral trades between the two countries.  
1
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Figure 2. Korean Trade with Canada: Korean View
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 The exports statistics are tabled not on the basis of final destination, and the 
imports data are collected on the basis of the country of origin. Thus, Canadian imports 
statistics includes the imports coming directly as well as indirectly from Korea. They are 
not the same as the Korean exports statistics that capture only the direct exports to Canada. 
The Korean imports data represent imports of the Canadian products, directly as well as 
through a third country, from Canada.  Therefore, we can reconstruct Canada’s total 
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imports, direct and indirect, of Korean goods and the total Korean imports of Canadian 
goods as follows: 
 
Figure 2. Imports on FOB
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 The trend of the balance of merchandise trades between Canada and Korea is given 
as follows:  
Figure 5. Reconstructed Canadian Trade Balance
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 We can notice a clear and interesting correlation; the balance of merchandise trade 
is in favor of Canada when the Canadian economic growth is slow, such as during the 
period of 1991 to 1996.  The trade balance is in favor of Korea when the Canadian 
economy exhibits a strong growth.  It implies that the Canadian demand for Korean goods 
might be dominated by a strong income effect. It also relates Canada’s current deficits 
with respect to Korea to its fundamental cause, i.e., Canada’s strong domestic economic 
growth, which exceeds the OECD average performances or the U.S. counterpart. 
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2) Analysis 
 Naturally our next questions are, “What has caused the fluctuations and changes in 
trades between Canada and Korea?” and “Can they be fully explained by economic 
variables?”  These are interesting for two reasons: first it sheds light on our better 
understanding of the causes of changes in the Canadian-Korean bilateral trade. By 
employing a proper analytical tool of statistical studies, we can test whether and to what 
extent fact a particular factor affects the trades.  It could also dispel any lingering doubt 
about the fairness of the counterpart in the bilateral trade.    
 In my earlier paper, for the quarterly data of 1980-99, I adopted the technique of 
multi-variate regression analysis which basically separates the impact of each determinant 
while controlling - holding constant- all others. First, a general import demand function 
was specified and estimated. The variables adopted to explain the changes in the imports 
were basically the national income of the importing countries, the price level of both 
countries, the price index of international competitors for the exporting nation, and the 
foreign exchange rates or the currency exchange rates between the two countries.  Other 
non-economic variables were included to pick up the impact of policy or structural 
changes.  The results remain valid for the extended data period. Here I present the 
summary of the regression results and their implications: 
 
1) Canadian Imports of Korean Merchandise 
 The most important determinants for the Canadian imports from Korea turn out to be 
the Canadian GDP, and the International Competitors’ Price Index. On the other hand, the 
prices of Korean exports themselves and currency exchange rates have virtually no 
significant impact.5  In other words, the own price elasticity is low, and the cross elasticities 
are very high.    
                                                 
5 The results are as follows. For details, refer to Han, J.D., “Long-Term Quantitative Analysis of 
Korea-Canadian Trades”, Canadian Studies Centre, 2001 . 
 
 
 
Explanatory Variables 
 
 
 
Short-run 
Elasticities 
 
 
Long-run 
Elasticities 
  
Korean GDP 
 
 
 
 
0.35% (+) 
 
0.61% (+) 
  
Canadian Commodity Prices  
  
0.60% ( - ) 
 
1.05% ( -)* 
  
International Competitors’ 
Prices 
  
0.74% (+) 
 
1.30% (+) 
  
Value of Canadian Dollars 
against Korean Won 
  
0.94% ( - ) 
 
1.65% ( -)* 
 
Note: The (partial) adjustment coefficient is 0.58, and is very close to that found for the 
Korean exports to Canada.  
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 These results bring a set of interesting interpretation of the underlying causes of 
the somewhat wildly fluctuating Korean exports to Canada:  
 First, we note that the magnitude of the estimated income elasticity is larger than one: 
the Canadian demand for Korean outputs is highly income elastic.  This suggests that as long 
as the Canadian economy is growing, its demand for Korean products will grow and the 
growth rates will exceed that of the Canadian GDP. In the long-run, this is good news as the 
Canadian economy is expected to continue to grow in a solid manner for the foreseeable 
future.  On the other hand, it also suggests that the Canadian imports of Korean products are 
highly cyclical; at a downturn of the Canadian business cycles, the demand for Korean 
products will take a deeper cut than the overall business.  In the long-term, the Korean 
exports to Canada will show a wide swing. This explains a bulk of the apparent instability of 
the post-1980 Korean exports.  
 Second, a relatively small magnitude of the estimated price-elasticity seems to 
contradict the conventional wisdom that the rising costs of Korean export industry are the 
major cause for the apparently sliding Korean exports in Canada.  My interpretation for this 
apparently paradoxical result is that the rising price index or weighted-average prices of a 
mixture of disparate outputs may reflect, to a certain extent, the improving qualities of 
Korean outputs. The increase in export revenues of a higher quality more than offsets the 
shrinking export revenues of the conventional low quality Korean outputs. This may be 
evidence that the Korean export industry as a whole has been scoring a success in moving 
upward along the ladder of qualities and unit prices in the Canadian market.6   
 On the other hand, the relative large magnitude of the estimated cross (price) 
elasticity implies that the Korean exports are faced with a fierce competition from other 
countries.  This formally confirms the argument that the developing countries, such as China 
and Vietnam, have been eroding the traditional Korean base in the Canadian market.   
 The combination of the two results as regards the price elasticities seem to suggest 
that, for the Korean export industry, the success strategy should focus on how fast the Korean 
export industry can move on along the scale of qualities and how smoothly it can make an 
intra-industry restructuring.  Given the degree of competition and market pressures, there is 
an ample justification, or need, for the resources spent in Canada by the Korean firms and 
government on various marketing endeavors.  
                                                                                                                                                   
 
 
6 Caution should be exercised in applying the above result to the Korean product of a fixed quality 
over time: the own price elasticity might be higher than our results indicate if we estimate the export 
function with a break-down of the industry classification or at an individual product level.   
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 Additionally, I have also tested whether the NAFTA or the recent Asian 
financial crisis has affected the Canadian imports from Korea in any significant manner. We 
have constructed and included the dummy variables representing the NAFTA and the Asian 
financial crisis. The test results indicate it was the case for both factors.  However, 
interestingly enough, the Asian Crisis has favorably affected the Canadian imports from 
Korea. This might be due to the special marketing efforts and export-drives launched by 
Korean firms and government at the onset of the international liquidity crisis.  
 
2) Canadian Exports to Korea 
 The Canadian exports to Korea are determined by the Korean GDP, the Canadian 
(Export) Commodity Price Index, the international competitors’ prices, and the currency 
exchange rates.  All these variables are found to be statistically significant.7  
 A low income elasticity and a low own-price elasticity are more less expected of the 
Canadian exports which mainly consist of primary industry outputs.  The Korean import 
demand for Canadian products responds, to the largest extent, to the currency exchange rate 
among many possible factors.  This means that the Canadian exports to Korea have been 
buttressed by a weak Canadian dollar for the last couple of years. .8     
 The next most important variable for the Canadian exports to Korea is the cross-price 
elasticity or the prices of the international competitors who compete with the Canadian 
exporters. This indicates that the Canadian export industry is faced with a quite high level of 
competition from its international competitors.   
  It should be also noted that the Canadian imports from Korea are clustered 
around a few items, such as automobiles and parts, electrical machinery and parts, and 
nuclear boiler related products. These three categories account for nearly 70% of Korea’s 
                                                 
7 The results are as follows: 
 
 
  
 
 
Explanatory Variables 
 
 
 
 
Short-run 
Elasticity 
 
Long-run 
Elasticity 
 
 
Canadian GDP 
  
1.23 % (+) 
 
 2.93% (+) 
 
 
Korean Producer’s Prices 
  
0.74%  ( - )* 
 
 1.76% ( -)* 
 
 
International Competitors’ 
Prices 
  
2.15 % (+) 
 
 5.11 % ( + ) 
 
 
Value of Canadian Dollars 
against Korean Won 
  
0.22% ( + )*  
 
0.52% ( + )* 
 
Note: * Its t-value is less than 1.99, and thus is statistically insignificant. We cannot reject the null hy. pothesis 
that they have no impact on the imports.  
8 The external values of the Canadian currency declined at the same time of the Asian Financial 
Crisis, and thus eased the impact of the falling external values of the Korean Won. 
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exports to Canada.  The Canadian exports also show a high concentration in terms of 
product items: woods pulps, and various minerals account for more than 50% of the total 
Canadian exports to Korea.  Clearly, there is a great room for diversification.  
 
 
Table.  Major Items of Trades between Canada and Korea 
  Canadian Imports from South Korea Canadian Exports to South Korea 
  Merchandise Classification % Merchandise Classification % 
1 Non-rail vehicles and parts 28.0 Wood pulp and other pulp 23.5 
2 Electrical machinery and parts 25.7 Mineral fuels, oils and waxes, etc. 13.2 
3 Boilers, machinery and parts 15.1 Aluminium and aluminium articles 7.6 
4 Iron and steel  3.5 Nickel and nickel articles 6.2 
5 Knitted or crocheted apparel 3.1 Electrical machinery and parts 5.2 
6 Rubber and rubber articles 2.8 Meat and edible meat offal 4.5 
7 Iron and steel articles 2.4 Boilers, machinery and parts 4.4 
8 Woven clothing and apparel 2.2 Fertilisers 4.4 
9 Plastics and plastic articles 2.2 Organic chemicals 4.1 
10 Optical/photographic equipment, etc. 1.5 Ores, slag and ash 3.8 
  Top 10 as % of Total From South Korea 86.6 Top 10 as % of Total To South Korea 76.9 
  S. Korean Imports as % of Cdn Total 1.39 S. Korean Exports as % of Cdn Total 0.53 
Source: Asia Pacific Foundation and Industry Canada 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. Foreign Direct Investment 
 
 
Canada is a net investor with respect to FDI, but a net recipient with respect to 
other kinds of investment and overall foreign investment. Outward FDI stock grew 
particularly fast from C $218.6 billion in 1997 to C $431.8 billion in 2002, registering the 
annual growth rate of 15%. The inward FDI totaled Can$349.9 billion, up 80% from C 
$194.2 billion in 1997.9 
                                                 
9 Most FDI in Canada is concentrated in resource-based activities (mainly energy), services 
(mostly financial services), transportation equipment, chemical products, textiles, food and 
beverages, and electrical and electronic products. The United States, the United Kingdom and 
France are Canada's largest sources of FDI, with 67%, 7.7% and 7.2% of the total, respectively, in 
2001, followed by the Netherlands, Japan, Germany, Italy, and Sweden. France has made the 
largest gains in market share over the past decade, while the United Kingdom, Japan, and Germany 
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Table.  Canadian FDI Abroad 
(Unit:Millions of dollars)  
        
             
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
 All countries  98,402109,068111,691 122,427 146,315 161,237 181,238 218,607 262,909 290,730 353,150 389,660 431,819
 North America  66,068 72,003 74,663 78,530 90,625 98,817 113,030 137,335 166,729 191,330 221,661 239,231 256,514
 Mexico 245 199 451 530 1,073 948 1,933 2,163 2,864 3,325 3,871 3,279 3,344
 United States  60,049 63,379 64,502 67,677 77,987 84,562 93,939 110,707 133,267 151,775 177,839 188,791 201,792
 South and Central America  2,341 2,441 3,093 4,346 6,032 7,855 9,952 12,603 15,287 17,091 21,422 20,921 15,026
 Europe  22,089 25,112 22,874 26,219 33,418 37,158 39,632 47,985 57,230 57,842 83,461 98,165 120,125
 Africa  268 258 301 400 469 635 1,217 1,301 1,385 1,445 2,430 3,418 3,538
 Asia/Oceania  7,636 9,253 10,760 12,932 15,785 16,772 17,407 19,383 22,278 23,023 24,176 27,925 36,615
 Australia  2,401 2,154 2,565 2,483 2,716 3,080 3,138 2,960 3,739 3,234 3,104 4,529 8,497
 Hong Kong  670 632 883 1,532 2,074 2,400 2,708 2,672 3,425 3,616 3,740 2,838 2,810
 Japan  917 2,182 2,521 2,845 3,485 2,739 2,676 2,985 3,268 3,853 5,664 7,033 9,203
 People's Rep of China  6 25 43 225 257 366 410 419 446 711 565 587 667
 Singapore  1,837 1,982 2,119 2,217 2,369 2,342 2,213 2,765 3,014 2,950 3,174 4,492 5,100
 South Korea  24 37 51 123 137 146 188 172 542 1,234 760 725 819
% in world 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.08 0.21 0.42 0.22 0.19 0.19
 
Source: CANSIM and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Canadian Government 
 
 
As the end of 2002, the Canadian foreign direct investment in Korea amounts to 
C$ 819 million, and Korean FDI in Canada to C$ 230 million. The Canadian FDI in Korea 
jumped sharply from C $ 172 in 1997 to C$542 in 1998, and to over C$ 1.2 billions in 
1999.  The figure stands at around C$ 0.8 billion for the last three years. This suggests that 
the Canadian capital has been responsive to the Korean’s calls for foreign investment in 
the wake of the Asian Financial Crisis.10  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      
Source: constructed from the Statistics Canada data. 
                                                                                                                                                   
have lost market share. The United States is also Canada's main investment destination, for both 
FDI and other kinds of investment, particularly portfolio investment, accounting for over half of 
total outward direct investment, followed by the United Kingdom and other EU Members. 
10 Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, Information, Analysis, Research and Outreach, 2003 
 
Foregn Direct Investment  between Canada and Korea
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
19
87
19
88
19
89
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
year
m
i
l
l
i
o
n
 d
o
l
l
a
r
s
Canadian
FDI in
Korea
Korea's FDI
in Canada
 14 
As suggested earlier, the Canadian FDI in Korea seeks to achieve an increasing 
alignment of the Korean-Canadian export industries in selected areas. The prospect of this 
kind of rather long-term partnership in intra-industry is extremely encouraging.11  We can 
find a historical precedence between Canadian and Japanese automobile party industries in 
the 1980s. Therefore, the recent trends of the Canadian FDI in Korea represent not only an 
impressive quantitative growth, but also a significant structural change. They forebode a 
closer industry cooperation and economic integration for the future.   
The total of Canada’s FDI in the world amounts to C $ 432 billions, and thus its 
investment in Korea account for only 0.2% of Canadian FDI in the world and for about 
2% of Canadian FDI in Asia.  There is a great room for expansion in this regard, waiting 
for a breakthrough.12   
 
 
4. International Demands for Education, and Mobility of Students and Teachers 
The Canadian educational sector has been making a great effort for globalization 
through the adoption of vigorous marketing strategies and the institution of foreign student 
friendly measures. This drive comes from a variety of roots:  The trend of globalization hit 
Canada, which took the form of cultural diversification to other countries than the U.S. 
and European countries. A the same time, being faced with public funding cuts in general 
and occasionally a declining student enrollment, many Canadian educational institutions 
started aiming at the revenues from international students.   They have come to realize that 
the Canadian education system as a whole provides a comparably high quality of services 
at highly competitive fees. 
The success of the Canadian education system as whole in this filed is well 
demonstrated with the fact that, In the period of six years between 1995 and 2001, the 
number of foreign students in Canada double;  the total number of foreign students in 
                                                 
11 There are about US $ 27 million worth of FDI negotiations going on between Canadian and 
Korean firms as of the 1st quarter of 2003.  The figures are from the Korean Embassy in Canada. 
12 Refer to the following table: 
Canadian Foreign Direct Investment in the World (C$ millions) 
 1980 1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 
US 17,849 60,049 84,562 177,839 188,791 201,792 
Europe 5,066 22,089 37,158 83,461 98,165 120,125 
Other North America * 2,109 6,019 14,255 43,822 50,440 54,722 
Asia ** 1,605 7,370 15,214 22,485 26,178 34,589 
South and Central America 1,162 2,341 7,855 21,422 20,921 15,026 
Other Regions *** 622 534 2,193 4,121 5,165 5,565 
Total  28,413 98,402 161,237 353,150 389,660 431,819 
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Canada increased from 63,000 in 1995 to 133,000 in 2001.  As shown in Figure below, 
two countries have helped the Canadian educational sector achieve a success in 
globalization; they are Korea and China.  
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Source: constructed from the Citizenship and Immigration Canada data. 
 
 
The total number of Korean students in Canada quadrupled in a very short period 
of 1994-96, changing from the magnitude of 2,400 to 9,000.  After the brief setback from 
the Asian Financial Crisis in 1998, the trend has regained the momentum and pushed the 
total number to about 20,000 in year 2001.  The trend is a way up from the general trend 
of Korean students bound for overseas studies: During the period of 1995-2001, the 
number of Korean students bound for Canada quadrupled while the total outbound Korean 
students increased only by 50%. In this regard, Canada has successfully broadened its 
clientele among the Korean student population. 
Behind the better-than-average performance of the Canadian education institutions  
lies Canada’s success in creating a welcoming environment for international students. It 
was most evident in the visa exemption for Korean short-term visitors, and the creation of 
educational information centers or CECs.  The visa exemption might have not directly 
boosted the number of regular Korean visa students. However, a large number of Korean 
students would test the ground first at somewhat peripheral education institutions, such as 
private language schools , before they make a choice of a regular educational institution.  
An easy entry into Canada and the positive images gained of Canadian institutions have 
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helped enlarge the Korean student population in Canada.  This is a great lesson; 
Institutional supports, such as diplomatic agreements between the governments, play a 
critical role of the catalyst in a situation where the pent-up demand exists.  
On the surface, this statistical figure of the total number of Korean students seems 
to be at the neck and neck with the Chinese counterpart.  However, this Korean figure 
represents only a part of Korean students in Canada. 
Many Korean students are coming for short-term ESL courses without a student 
visa.  Some argue that at any given time point the number of Korean students in this 
category may exceed the number of regular Korean visa students, and estimate combined 
total number of Korean students in Canada at over 50,000 as of 2003.13  Obviously, the 
visa exemption agreement between Canada and Korea, which came into effect in May, 
1994, has provided such a convenient channel for a short-term language and cultural 
expedition, which by now has become a ritual among many Korean university and college 
students.  Therefore, Korea has become by far the largest source of international demand 
for Canadian educational services in Canada.  
What sets Korea students apart from those from other countries is that a large 
number of Korean students in Canada are younger ones. As of the end of 2001, 6,500 
Korean students attend the secondary school or lower levels, and thus account for about 
one third of the total Korean students in Canada.  This figure accounts for about one 
quarter of the total foreign students in all the Canadian secondary and pre-secondary 
schools; one out of every four foreign students in those schools is Korean.   
This age profile sharply contrasts with the major contender’s case; for instance, the 
most of Chinese students, 15,000 out of the total of 20,000, are attending the university or 
other post-secondary institutions in Canada.  
The long-term implications of this distinctive feature deserve research attention.  
For one thing, the duration of the studies by these young Korean students in Canada might 
be longer than that of mature students. There is a higher likelihood that these students will 
be culturally assimilated into a Canadian society. It in turn leads to a permanent migration 
of the students themselves, the accompanying patrons and eventually the entire family.  
The multiplier effect or ramification of this type of foreign students seems to be much 
larger compared with other age levels of foreign students.  
                                                 
13 In fact, according to the National Institute for International Education Development,  a 
Korean government agency has put the number of Korean students bound for Canada, which 
apparently include the student with and without visas, at 54,000 for 1999 against the backdrop of 
the total outbound Korean students of 154,000. This figure compared with 43,000 Korean students 
bound for U.S. and 13,000 for Japan.  
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The migration of the young students is more closely associated with the 
migration of the family.  It is not surprising that in Canada two origin countries have been 
the case: the U.S., and Hong Kong.  Currently the U.S. is the second largest source 
country of the young foreign students in Canada, which, needless to say, reflects the 
extremely close economic integration between the U.S. and Canada.  Most of the 4,200 
young American attending Canadian secondary and lower level schools are dependent of 
the American workers; this means that they do not pay the high tuitions charged of foreign 
students. In contrast, most of the 6,500 Korean young students are paying the international 
student fees, which range from $9,000 to $11,000 for an academic year. 
The two flows, of the dependents and the principals, do not have to be 
contemporary. In fact, this distinct feature of the age compositions of Korean students in 
Canada can find a recent historical precedence in the migration from Hong Kong 
throughout the 1970s to 80s.  At the 1990-1991 peak of inflows of Hong Kong students to 
Canada, about a third of 14,000 Hong Kong students in Canada were attending the 
secondary schools or less.  
The flow of the dependents preceded the flow of the principals.  For the Hong 
Kong residents who were determined to migrate out of Hong Kong by a certain deadline 
such as the 1997 return of sovereignty to China, the younger family members played the 
role of cultural ‘reconnaissance’ , if not a ‘Guinea Pig’, dispatched to Canada for the 
entire family who were to follow them.  
A recent survey in Korea shows that the single most important motivation for a 
possible immigration is a better education for children.14  It is difficult to clarify the 
direction of causality; whether migration of children as foreign students calls for migration 
of the entire family, or vice versa. It is clear that education of the younger family members 
and migration of the mature family members are closely correlated.   
We can safely predict that given the composition of ages, the recent surge of the 
Korean young students in Canada may forebode a big surge in Korean immigrants to 
Canada.   
On the other hand, the Canadian production factor, particularly the human capital, 
has been flowing in an increasing speed and volume of streams to Korea. It is because 
                                                 
14 The results of the Korea Gallup survey of September 20, 2003 with 1,042 show that one out of 
every three Korean adults is willing to consider immigration. Particularly, those in their twenties, 
thirties, and forties have a higher desire for immigration. The most popular destination is Canada; 
Canada is listed as the best desired destination for 27% of those who are willing to consider 
immigration. Their main motivation of migration is for a better education and opportunity for their 
children.  
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those Korean who cannot come to Canada have brought the Canadians for teaching. As 
of the end of 2002, over 7,000 Canadians are granted working visa for the employment at 
language training institutions in Korea.  This number exceeds the number of U.S. citizens 
in similar positions, which stands at 6,000.  It is extraordinary that every one of three 
native language teachers in Korea came from Canada.15  
What prediction can we make for the flow of Koreans and Canadians in the area of 
education?  That infamous recent ‘TV home shopping episode’ reveals a tip of the iceberg 
of the enormous pent-up demand by Koreans for Canadian immigration.  Given the close 
correlation between early overseas education and immigration, the demand for Canadian 
educational services by Koreans will continue to grow with the limit to be set only by non-
market forces.16  These non-market interferences may eventually be removed, which will 
lead to waves after waves of Korean youngsters flowing to Canadian educational 
institutions. They will bring out reciprocal rippling movement by Canadians as ESL 
teachers.   
The supply side depends on the demographic and socio-political situations in 
Canada.  For instance, the Canadian universities and colleges experienced a rapid 
expansion in the 1970s and 80s in response to the growing student population.  
Subsequently, the 1990s witnessed that the Canadian universities and colleges were 
pressed to look for international students and to fill up the room, financial and physical, 
which was created by the quirky Canadian demographic down turns along the age pyramid 
and was aggravated by cuts in government’s public fund for education.  This led to a more 
aggressive recruiting effort on the part of universities and colleges, and eventually to an 
increased number of international students in the Canadian university and colleges.   
Lately, the pendulum has been moving in the opposite direction, but not for long. 
Ontario universities and colleges just have been struggling to meet the overwhelming 
domestic demand; a swelling high student population and the abolition of the last 
secondary school grade(Grade 13) combined to create the so-called ‘double cohort’ in 
which university applications have doubled.  The boom is in. However, the eyes of far-
sighted administrators are already on the horizon where the boom time is eventually over 
and the educational institutions needs students to fill the facilities.   
This kind of supply-side shock is a real possibility of the near future for the 
Canadian secondary and lower level education system, given the unique age composition 
of the Canadian population, and the fluid situations of public funding for education.  The 
                                                 
15 The statistics is from the Ministry of Education and Human Resources Development, Korean 
government. 
16 The Korean government has been inconsistent in its policy towards the early overseas education. 
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Canadian demographic twists and turns further accentuated by public policy shocks may 
flip and flop the supply side of those levels of education at any time point.17   
 
5. Tourism Sector and Other Services 
 
Upon the sign of the agreement of visa exemption for short-term visits between 
Canada and Korea, the number of Korean tourists doubled in a year: from 49,000 in 1993 
to 101,000 in 1994. For the next two years before Korea was hard hit with the Asian 
Financial Crisis, the total number of Korean tourists showed another 70% increase.  About 
157,000 Korean visited Canada in 2001. This precipitous increase is unprecedented, and 
carves up the importance of reducing the legal barrier to international mobility of human 
factors. The Korean tourists accounted for about 1.4% of the total number of the non-U.S. 
citizen tourists in 1993, and the figure rose to 3.7% in 2001. 
Figure  Korean Tourists in Canada
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Source: constructed from the Statistics Canada and CASIM data 
 
 Tourist visits last for a short-term period of time, but they frequently repeat 
themselves and extend into a longer period of stays through migration.  The tourists tend 
to revisit the host country.  Student tourists may come back to Canada for studies. The 
                                                 
17 When boom is over, it creates “Bust”.   As the Echo generation (born from 1980 to 1995) moves 
onto each clung of ladder of education system, and the next generation is smaller in number, there 
will be fewer students in classroom, leaving idle capacities, first in the elementary schools, then in 
the secondary schools, and finally in the university.17  At different times in the next two decades, 
each level of Canadian education institutions will be faced with the options of either to scale down 
or to compete for students.  If they opt for the second, we will witness a lot more aggressive 
recruitment efforts aimed at foreign students. Refer to D. Foot, Boom, Bust and Echo. 
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average duration of foreign students’ stay in Canada is about 2 years18.  Sometimes, 
tourist visits lead to permanent migration of human capital.  Prospective immigrants wish 
to look around Canada and try to get the feel for their future adaptation in the newly 
adopted country.  The international travels by tourists are an important leading indicator 
for the future economic interaction involving migration of labor and human capital.      
 Canada’s net receipt from Korea in the tourism sector grew, by leaps and bounds, 
from C$ 10 million in 1993 to C $ 108 million in 1995, and C$ 251 million in 2001. 19 
 
 
6. Immigration 
 
 During the period of 1951-1970, a cumulative sum of 3,000 Koreans immigrated to 
Canada.   In ten yeas of period during the 1970s, 12,600 Koreans moved to Canada in total, 
and the 1980s witness a mild increase in its number to 14,000.  However, in the 1990s the 
ten-year cumulative sum of Korean new immigrants in Canada jumped to about 40,000.  
The annual inflow figures rapidly grew and doubled from 3,100 in 1996 to 7,200 in 1999.  
The number reached the peak at 9,600 in 2001. 
 This impressive and unswerving growth of Korean immigration to Canada 
contrasts with the situation surrounding the Korean immigration to the traditionally 
favorite destination, i.e., the U.S.  The annual flows of Korean new immigrants to U.S. 
first declined sharply at the turning point of the onset of the Asian Financial Crisis and 
continued to be depressed for the most of the second half of the 1990s. The figure hit the 
bottom of the trend line in 1999 at 12,800, and then slowly recovered to the initial level in 
2001. In other words, the Korean immigration demand for the U.S. destination appears to 
be closely related to the up and downs of the Korean economy over this entire course of 
time period.   
                                                 
18 The average duration of study by foreign students in Canada is 1.91 years and 1.79 years for 
males and females. “Foreign Students in Canada 1980-2001”, report by the Citizenship and 
Immigration Canada, January 2003. 
19 Canada’s total net receipt from Korea in all service transactions was a surplus of C $435 million 
in 2001, which fared extremely well with the 1993 figure of C$28 million. 
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Korean Immigration to Canada and the U.S.
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Source: constructed from the US Census and Statistics Canada data; by courtesy of Dr. P. Ibbott. 
 
It also suggests that the Koreans have substituted Canada for the U.S. as the former 
has become more affordable than the second.  A soaring employment turned out a large 
number of potential immigrants in the Korean society during the Asian Financial Crisis.  
Being faced with choices of immigration countries, many factors worked in favor of 
Canada for the following reasons: First, Koreans started recognizing many attractive 
socio-political features of the Canadian society. It was about the time when the U.N. 
ranked Canada at the top in terms of the human development index.  Second, the visa 
exemption for tourists provided Koreans for a change to verify information in person or to 
try a new life on an experimentation basis.  Third, the Asian Financial Crisis brought a 
sudden decline in the external value of Korean currency against the U.S. dollars.  This led 
to a decline of the U.S. dollar values of the Korean prospective immigrants’ properties and 
savings.   
However, by coincidence, the Canadian dollars weakened considerably against the 
U.S. dollars during this period.  The Koreans realized that the immigration to Canada, 
along with the conversion of their Won-dominated assets into the Canadian dollar, secured 
them a larger amount of resources for rooting down in the new country than what they 
would get from the immigration to the U.S. along with the Won-U.S. dollar conversion.   
Clearly, this has facilitated the substitution of the Korean immigration demand from the 
U.S. to Canada.  We have found a close correlation to the external value of Canadian 
dollars and the number of Korean immigrants to Canada.    
   While the Canadian dollar has gained the external value in a drastic way for the 
last twelve months, the Korean demand for Canadian immigration seems to be undeterred.  
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It may be largely due to the recent inflation of the property values in Korea. In other 
words, the positive wealth effect has more than offset the negative price effect coming 
from the unfavorable changes in exchange rates.  This means that as long as the real estate 
values are sustained in Korea, there will be a steady stream of immigration to Canada.20  
There is a huge pent-up demand for immigration among Koreans. 21  The total 
immigrant flows from Korea to Canada are mainly demand-driven for two factors: First, 
Canada is expected to basically maintain the open door policy.  Basically, it is the case of 
the Canadian immigration policy of the recent years with some variations.  
Second, the wealth effect for the Canadian Korean immigration demand seems to 
be high.  A remarkable feature of the recent Korean immigrants to Canada is that over 
60% to 70% of them fall under the category of skilled workers.  Business immigration 
accounts for about 25% to 20%, and the family reunion cases for less than 10% of the total 
Korean immigrants.  The first two groups can be broadly categorized as ‘economic 
immigrants’.  The dominance of the two groups in the total Korean immigrants is more 
prominent than that found in the Japanese, Chinese, and Hong Kong cases, which all have 
traditionally a high proportion of business and skilled-worker immigration; the two groups 
of immigrants account for about 50% of the Japanese immigrants, and 55% of the Hong 
Kong residents.  The Korean figure is comparable to the Taiwanese case, where 85% of 
the Taiwanese immigrants to Canada are in the categories of business immigration and 
skilled-worker immigration.    
These immigrants are the end result of accumulation of human capital and wealth. 
The sustained economic growth in Korea will continue to lead to wealth creation and 
human capital accumulation, and will in turn fuel the immigration demand in the 
categories of entrepreneurs and skilled workers. T 
This contrasts with the conventional concept of immigrants who bring little 
resources of immediate use with themselves. This implies that these new Korean 
immigrants are quite different from those who have preceded them in migration to Canada.  
                                                 
20 What determines the Korean demand for immigration to Canada is beyond the scope of this 
paper. Han and Ibbott have been working on the model to develop the Korean demand function for 
immigration to Canada and to the U.S. in the framework of simultaneous equation estimation. 
   
21 There are two recent survey results reported. According to the Korea Gallup Co, which 
conducted a survey of 1042 Koreans on September 20, 2003, one out of every three Korean adults 
is willing to consider immigration. Particularly, those in their twenties, thirties, and forties have a 
higher desire for immigration. The most popular destination is Canada; Canada is listed as the best 
desired destination for 27% of those who are willing to consider immigration. Their main 
motivation of migration is for a better education and opportunity for their children. The second 
result is from  
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Their infusion may bring an interesting socio-economic dynamic to the Korean-
Canadian society, and the existing relationship between Canada and Korea.  
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Source: constructed from the Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Immigration Statistics, by 
courtesy of Dr. P. Ibbott. 
 
The relationship between trade and immigration has been gaining quite substantial 
empirical supports. It is an extension of a new branch of international trade theory, or the 
so-called “Gravity Theory and Border Effect”. 22 In a nutshell, according to this theory, 
immigrants help reducing the barriers to international trades between their home and host 
countries.   
Wagner, Head, and Ries estimated immigrant effects for Canada using cross-
province variation in international trade and immigration patterns. They noticed the 
relationship between immigration and trade, on the basis of the proposition that 
immigrants use their connections and superior "market intelligence" to exploit trade 
opportunities. They found that the average new immigrant expands exports to his/her 
native country by C$312 and expands imports by C$944.23 
Baker and Bejamin extend the above study for Canada to the international context 
by including the immigration trade substitution effect across the U.S.-Canada border.  
Their results reinforce the earlier findings and show a significantly larger elasticity of 
                                                 
22 Deardorff, A.V.,  "Determinants of Bilateral Trade: Does Gravity Work in a Neoclassical 
World?” NBER Working Papers 5377, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, 1995. 
 
This paper compares the Hechscher-Ohlin model with the Gravity Theory. They explores the case 
where two countries produce distinct goods, Here trade tends to the standard gravity equation with 
trade declining in distance, with departures from it that depend on relative transport costs. 
Conclusions are, first, that even a simple gravity equation can be derived from standard trade 
theories, and second, that because the gravity equation characterizes many models, its use to test 
any of them is suspect. 
 
23 Wagner, D, Head, K., and Reis, J.,  “Immigration and the Trade of Provinces”, Scottish Journal 
of Political Economy, vol 49(5), November 2002, pages 507-525 
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trades and FDI with respect to immigration for the case of the Asia Pacific Rim 
countries.24  
This is particularly the case for the immigrants from the Southeastern China, 
including Hong Kong.  However, an increase in Parkistanese and Indian immigrants has 
had hardly any impact on trades between their newly adopted country, Canada, and their 
countries of birth.  Globerman has noticed the distinctive feature that the majority of the 
Southeastern Chinese immigrants of the 1970s to the early 1990s were entrepreneurial 
immigrants under the category of business immigration. 25  
This finding can be applied to the Korean case; given the fact that a large portion 
of recent Korean immigrants falls in the category of business immigrants, the trade-
inducing multiplier effect of Korean immigration will be substantial.  
Hutchinson uses the Gravity Theory of international trades and identifies language 
distance between the two trading countries as a deterrent to bilateral international trades.26  
Girma and Yu have found that in the U.K, the immigrants from the former British colonies 
or the Commonwealth areas are not export-enhancing but import-substituting while the 
immigrants from the non-Commonwealth areas are highly export- and import-enhancing. 
They explain that the difference between the two groups lies in the fact that the 
immigrants from the Commonwealth areas do not bring any `new information’ about their 
home countries to the U.K., and do not reduce any existing ‘distance’ between the two 
trading countries.27  
Perhaps the cultural distance is probably a more comprehensive deterrent. It 
implies that the more distant the two cultures of the trading partners, the more 
impediments to the international trades, and thus the more roles to play by the immigrants 
between the two countries. Language and cultural difference between Korea and Canada is 
substantial, and thus the distance provides the ample room where the Korean immigrants 
in Canada can play in promotion of bilateral trades.    
 
7. Conclusion 
The economic interactions between Canada and Korea have risen to a prominence 
in the recent years.  It was mainly due to the common trends of globalization in the two 
                                                 
24 Baker, M., and Bejamin, D., “Asia Pacific Immigration and the Canadian Economy”, The Asia 
Pacific Region in the Global Economy: A Canadian Perspective, University of Calgary Press, 
1996, pp. 303-356. 
25 Globerman, S., “Globalization and Immigration”, mimeo.  
26 Hutchinson, W., and Dunlevy, J.A., “The Pro-Trade Effect of Immigration on American Exports 
during the Classical Liberal Period”, Vanderbilt University, mimeo, September 2001. 
27 Girma, S., and Yu, Z., “The Link Between Immigration and Trade: Evidence from the U.K.”, 
Research Paper 2000/23, Centre for Research on Globalisation and Labour Market, University of 
Nottingham. 
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countries. However, the growth is characterized with remarkable features, which reflect 
the combination of some fortuitous and some hard-earned matches of opportunities 
between the two countries. These unique features have brought positive dynamics to the 
present, and imply structural changes in their relationship for the future.  
Although the bilateral trade between the two countries remain a relative small 
portion of their total international trades, we have to take notice of the structural change 
that have initiated an increasing degree of alignment of the selective Canadian and Korean 
export industries through outsourcing and FDI.  These are still in their early stage and 
need nurturing and mutual cooperation at the level of both government and business 
sectors, separately and jointly. 
The results of the long-term quantitative analysis of the Canada-Korean trades 
show that the substantial part of fluctuations of the Canadian imports from Korea can be 
explained by the Canadian business cycles. As the Canadian economy is expected to 
outperform the most industrialized countries, it is good news for Korean export industries. 
The human factor mobility has increased drastically between Canada and Korea, 
whose full socio-economic impacts are to unfold in the future.  Korea has become the 
largest source of demand for the Canadian educational services, produced in the Canadian 
institutions and in the Korean institutions.  Korean demand for the Canadian educational 
services lead to 7,000 jobs for Canadians at the present time, and thus contributes to a 
significant reduction in the unemployment rate among the Canadian workers of younger 
ages.   The age profile of the Korean students in Korea is extremely interesting; the 
relatively large share of younger Korean students may herald a larger scale of migration of 
human capital for the future.   
The post-Asian Financial Crisis era witnessed a surge of Korean immigrants to 
Canada, and a substantial degree of demand switch from the U.S. destination among the 
Korean immigrants.  This seems to have been facilitated by a number of favorable factors, 
such as visa exemptions for short-term visitors and tourists, a falling external value of the 
Canadian currency, and the other socio-political factors.  Most of the Korean recent 
immigrants fall in the categories of ‘economic immigrants’ with a considerable amount of 
accumulated tangible and human capital.  A strong recovery of the Korean economy and 
the sustained economic growth will continue to fuel the immigration demand. As a result, 
the Korean society will go through dynamic changes, which provide opportunities as well 
as challenges.  Across the Pacific Ocean, with the infusion of these new immigrants, the 
Canadian society in general and the Korean Canadian society in particular will be immune 
to the dynamic challenges in socio-economic aspects, neither. 
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